1.
Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.
2. This Research Contribution outlines a methodology for interpreting the Soviet military literature. It identifies the subject matter that seems to yield the best evidence of Soviet intentions; the spheres of Soviet military thought that deal with this subject matter; the relationship of these spheres to official military policy and doctrine; the problems involved in assessing the truthfulness and authoritativeness of the literature; and some of the "do's and don'ts" in analyzing it.
3. Research Contributions are published for their potential value in other studies and analyses. They do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy. 4 . Enclosure (1) has been cleared for public release with no restrictions on its dissemination.
FOREWARD
This Research Contribution is a slightly modified excerpt of a much larger 0 interpretive work. 1 It has been prepared as a ready, compact aid for readers of Soviet military writings. It describes techniques for extracting latent content that have proven to be notably effective. Through these techniques, analysis of open-source Soviet literature has yielded insights into the emergence of a pro-SSBN mission for the Soviet general-purpose force navy and a withholding strategy for Soviet SSBNs.
One of the keys to the full exploitation of Soviet literature is collegial exchange between practitioners. CNA would greatly value readers' comments, reactions, criticisms, and especially, reports of the practical application of these techniques. 
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NTIS GRAkI
CTIC
Introduction Subject Matter
At bottom, this is a work to promote the In the 1960s, the Soviets were reasonably frank in exploitation of Soviet open-source literature on discussing their new, all-out nuclear option for coalition military affairs, which is in a state of relative neglect.
warfare. The frankness here contrasted sharply with their There is a saying in the community-only partly an veiled discussions, even at the time, of non-coalition exaggeration-that there are almost as many Western (local) war, and since the 1970s, obliqueness in doctrinal interpretations of Soviet military intentions as there are treatments has become the pervasive rule. In no instance Western analysts. It could be argued that one primary have new options been directly announced; instead, explanation for the wide divergence in the findings of selected aspects of military affairs have been discussed in Western analysts is an equally wide divergence in the such a way as to imply new options or the modification, methodologies used for determining the content and downgrading, or abandonment of old ones. authoritativeness of Soviet statements. Because analysts rarely make their methodological approaches That is our first order of business-to identify explicit, decision makers have had no basis for selecting those categories of Soviet military thought that seem to between competing interpretations, and have fallen offer the most promise for obliquely indicating Soviet back exclusively on the "hard data" produced by options that are to be developed in the future or have technical means of intelligence (which is often not all reached (or are about to reach) the hardware-operational that "hard"). That is unfortunate. Soviet military stage. For reasons of space as well as special salience, literature is not only another source for Soviet inwe will limit ourselves to Soviet views on the tentions but sometimes the best and even the only following subjects: source for certain aspects. In any event, it seems the earliest source.
0 The "correlation of war and policy" in the ongoing "revolution in military affairs" Rather than present the usual substantive (approximate subject matter); findings, therefore, this paper will try to make explicit the methodology behind substantive findings pub-* "The character of war and its specifics" with lished by the author on other occasions.' Success in respect to the scale of state participation in reading the Russians depends heavily on an apthe war, its coalitional or non-coalitional preciation of the Soviet communication process; they character, the types of weapons used, the are simply not straightforward in discussing their scope of combat action, the intensity of military options. They employ what might be dubbed combat, its expected duration, and the a general "implicative" technique in which the writer political objectives of the opposing sides; implies and the reader is obliged to infer, becoming thereby an active participant in the communication 0 The "methods of warfare"; process. There are two aspects to this: an obliqueness of subject matter and, superimposed on that, an
• The impact of these methods on certain obliqueness of treatment. We will examine these and "principles of the military art" (especially other problems in the following order: the subject the principles of surprise, "economy of matter that seems the most fruitful in yielding force" and "partial victory"); evidence of Soviet intentions, the disciplines and sources that deal with this subject matter, how to 0 The "types and forms" of strategic action; determine the truth value and authoritativeness of Soviet statements, and some of the crucial "do's and * The factors influencing the "course and don'ts" of analysis.
outcome of war."
The very first of these subject-matter categories, official, and hence are referred to as "systems of which comes within the competence of a "scientific" views," rather than systems of knowledge. It is of most interest to us, perhaps, when considering the following subjects: There can be no doubt of the importance of these 1) war as a continuation and instrument of policy, and five latter categories to Soviet military strategy.
the return influence of war on policy, 2) the so-called According to one writer, "problem of war and peace," 3) the "social nature and types of wars," and 4) Leninist Theory on the Defense Military science studies the character and of the Socialist Fatherland, which governs "military specifics of wars and the laws governing development." War and the Army is said to furnish their course and outcome; it develops and the ideological-theoretical and methodological formulates the principles governing military foundation for all three of the other components of art and determines the most expedient military thought 12 However, the main substantive methods of warfare in a given war ... 3 impact of War and the Army is on mtlitary policy 13 and on the socio-poliical side of military doctrine. 14 The only one of our military-scientific categories not Military science also makes "recommendations" mentioned in this quotation is that dealing with the directly to doctrine, 15 but it affects the military-"types and forms of strategic action," but there can be technical rather than the socio-political side of no doubt of its importance either. The Sokolovskiydoctrine. The Soviets also tell us that military science edited work on Military Strategy in the 1960s devoted can influence military policy, both directly and thirty pages specifically to that subject, which it through doctrine. 16 introduced with the statement: "It is possible to say without exaggeration that the development of effective There are a number of misconceptions in the methods of modem warfare depends to a decisive West about the official spheres that deal with military extent on a correct solution to the problem of the types affairs. One view has it that military doctrine is the of strategic action and the concrete form in which highest conceptual level in the hierarchy of Soviet they appear." 4 military thought. 17 This is incorrect; the highest level is occupied by military policy." 8 The strategy that Disciplines flows from and serves military policy-the so-called "military-policy (or military-political) strategy"-is A word on the disciplines involved in this subject said to be more or less equivalent to the U.S. matter and their relation to official thinking. There are concept of strategic doctrine, grand strategy, four spheres that go to make up Soviet "military national-security strategy, etc.
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Soviet military thought": Marxist-Leninist Theory on War and the policy is declared to be "an integral part of party Army, military science, military policy, and military policy," and is normally referred to as the military doctrine. 5 The first two are considered to be policy "of the Communist Party"; 20 on occasion it "sciences" 6 ('systems of knowledge") 7 that deal is also referred to as a policy "of party and state." 21 theoretically with military affairs, with one (War and The reason for this dual possession is not clear. It the Army) studying the military-policy aspects, 8 and may be because military policy is formulated by the the other (military science) examining the purely Party and executed by the state, or because it is military side ('the armed struggle"). 9 The other two normally promulgated in the form of joint decrees spheres-military policy and military doctrine-are of Party and government.
On the other hand, military doctrine, which is Russians say but from noticing the timing of doctrinal subordinate to and flows from military policy, is innovations, which tend to cluster at the beginning of always-I repeat, always-referred to as a military the economic planning periods. It is sometimes late in doctrine "of the state."" That is no doubt because it the planning period before we see hardware deis formulated by the so-called "political and military ployments for an option; it is sometimes rather late (or military-policy) leadership of the state," the before we see hardware testing. However, the Soviets traditional designation for the pre-war "defense counusually begin discussing the option on the very eve of, cils" and "defense committees"23 that were models for or early in, the new planning period. The Defense the present-day USSR Defense Council 24 chaired by Council will be aware of the weapons and equipment Gorbachev.
These pre-war bodies were state it has authorized for that plan 37 war and policy-is fruitful for Soviet long-range "subcommittee of the Politburo"; no high-level party intentions, while the other five categories--the body would be formed by an organ of state.
character and specifics of war, the methods of waging war, the principles of the military art, the types and Doctrine is said to be a "concrete expression" of forms of strategic action, and the factors influencing military policy, 28 which mediates between the latter the course and outcome of war-seem to reflect and military strategy. 29 Its socio-political side is mid-term intentions only. The correlation of war and basically derived from military policy, 3 0 while its policy comes within the purview of War and the military-technical side is selected from the recomArmy, which examines military-policy problems and mendations of military strategy. 3 1 Doctrine performs has the same time horizon as military policy. 4 0 The this mediating function, however, only in peacetime content of the other categories, however, is either and at the start of a war. In the course of the war, specified in, or flows from, military doctrine. doctrine drops out and military policy and strategy confront each other directly.
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To be sure, the problem is not quite that simple. These five latter categories are also dealt with by Among other things, military policy and military military science (military strategy specifically), which doctrine differ in their time horizons.
Whereas has no restrictions on its vision. Whereas military military (and military-technological) policy deal with doctrine deals only with "the present" and "near current (one-year), mid-term (five-year) and long-term future," military science is said to be concerned with (10-15 or more year) defense tasks and requirethe "past," the "present," and the "future" as a whole, ments, 3 3 doctrine is said to deal only with the including the "more remote future" as well as the "present" (apparently the period up to two years away) "near." 41 That is the case in theory, and I have no and the "near future" 34 (defined as the period three to doubt of its being the case in fact, except that it cannot five years away);
35 it does not deal with the "more be demonstrated from Soviet literature for the remote future," as military policy does. The five-year subject-matter categories examined here. 42 It is exrestriction on doctrine is apparently due to its tremely rare to see these discussed by military strasynchronization with the five-year economic plans.
tegists in a manner to point beyond the "near future." The economic-plan orientation of doctrine was * obliquely indicated by a 1959 military discussion, in The explanation for this, in my opinion, lies in which the meaning of the expression "near term," the existence of two phases to military science: a prenormally five years away, was expanded to cover the doctrinal phase, in which military science pioneers period through 1965, i.e., the same period covered by more or less freely, paving the way for doctrine; and a the 1959-1965 seven-year plan. 36 However, the main post-doctrinal, in which military science takes its point reason for associating doctrine with the Soviet of departure in doctrine and spins out its logic. planning penchant is not derived from anything the Doctrine selects from the findings of the first phase, casts its selections in the form of general principles, As for the official or unofficial character of real and returns them to military science for further messages, perhaps we can approach it via the followelaboration. 43 the Soviets consistently stress the authoritative roots of doctrine and its obligatory character as a guide to It is important to bear in mind the distincaction, 4 7 while the Western point about its amortion between a lie and a misleading statephousness seems overstated. ment. Soviet pronouncements are carefully written, and can be carefully analyzed.
The problem is not with the authoritativeness Their statements often encourage readers to or relevance of avowedly doctrinal statements, but draw misleading conclusions; but they are with their rarity. In the 1960s, the Soviets openly, rarely lies .... 44 and often, tied their all-out nuclear cption for coalition warfare to doctrine. 51 Both the appearance and the the armed forces 4 or, more likely, by the disappearance of doctrinal authenticators serve to General Staff, as the working organ of that leaderillustrate the declining frankness of Soviet military ship). Once approved, they are said to acquire the literature over time. The avowedly doctrinal statesame "force of law" within the armed forces that ments of the 1960s were superseded in the first half of doctrine has throughout the state. 
Doctrine. This is by far the most numerous category might be termed "doctrinal authenticators," i.e., the of Soviet statements dealing with the subject matter substitution, for an overt label, of pars pro toto defiexamined in this paper. It consists of those works, nitions and descriptions of doctrine and concrete mentioned earlier, that take their point of departure in expressions of doctrine, the parts selected to represent doctrine (and policy). While these works have to the whole often being the least specific. This obliges survive the gauntlet of colleagues, editors and censors, the reader to keep in his memory a congeries of partial they are given no formal authoritative blessing; it definitions of doctrine and its concrete expressions, would be an impossible task to provide an imprimatur insofar as they differ from the definitions and descripfor everything in print. Unofficial expressions of tions of military science proper, i.e., military science doctrine are identified on the basis of the corresponin its first pre-doctrinal phase. Thus, instead of saydence of an author's views with the views of other ing that a work expounds military doctrine, an editor authors at a given time. or reviewer could say that it constitutes a "system of views" (the definition of anything official-military Private Views and Polemics. Western analysts policy, military-technical policy, military doctrine, or tend to find more disputes in the Soviet military literature its concrete expressions-as opposed to military than is warranted by the evidence, and under the reflex science proper, which is defined as a "system of assumptions of the bureaucratic-politics model, they tend knowledge"). Further, an editor might justify the to interpret obvious disputes as reflections of institutional work as promoting a "unity of views" or "common vested interests rather than professional differences of views" (again, the function of official communicaopinion. My own impression is that, of the debates that tions, in contrast to military science proper, which must rage behind the scenes (many no doubt rooted in makes "recommendations" and is characterized by a bureaucratic rivalry), few get published that the military "struggle of opinions"). Or an author might note. that literature we see comes from a disciplined, consensushis prime interest is in "the present and near future" loving press; and that the vast majority of published (the temporal focus of doctrine, as opposed to military authors, as well as their editors and colleagues, think their science's preoc..pation with "past, present, and works are in the mainstream (though they can make future"). If a reviewer goes further and says that the mistakes). Indeed, disputes are so rare in print that an work "proceeds from doctrine" and "validates" it, then analyst ought to take great pains to justify his conclusion we know, by definition, that it constitutes a concrete that differences are being aired? Debates, in fact, are expression of doctrine. 50 not all that hard to spot. An author or editor will openly declare a work to be for discussion purposes; or named or Doctrinal authenticators are infrequently emunnamed Soviet authors will be attacked. Even here, ployed. I am aware of only a handful of examples, all however, a distinction should be made between polemics from the first half of the 1970s: a series of articles by directed against a superseded official view, and polemics Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet in a controversy still alive. to coincide with obligatory projection requirements. Some observers restrict their recognition of surrogates Soviet expositors of the Western scene are adept at to Soviet domestic debates and debates within the stretching and molding actual Western statements to socialist camp over sensitive issues. Others are prearrive at the desired symmetry in intentions. However, pared to recognize them only when the views and this effort is no more realistic than Freudian dream intentions attributed to the West are patently false, work when it exploits real events of the previous day in although it is not clear how the Soviet reader is usuthe memory to fashion inner-determined phantasies.
ally in a position to make such discriminations. Of course, the Soviets have ways of negating the There are obviously certain spheres in which one surrogate force of attributions. They might take note would not expect to find surrogate treatments; when of official U.S. statements and then pronounce them Soviet authors dilate on the disarray in NATO, for deceptions, camouflage for quite different intentions. example, this is not to be understood as a veiled referWhen referring to certain Western capabilities, they ence to Warsaw-Pact infighting. There are other can declare them ineffectual, or unsuitable for the spheres where a capitalist surrogate is inappropriate USSR on military-geographic grounds. 54 On occaand only a socialist surrogate will do (e.g., during the sion, they will acknowledge a Western capability, but early stages of the Sino-Soviet conflict, when Beijing then state that the Soviet response will be asymmetriused Belgrade and Moscow used Tirana as substitutes cal; if no such statement is made, symmetry is to be for their real revisionist-dogmatist targets). However, inferred. 55 Another, much more common method is to there are certain other, ideologically neutral fields, declare that, regardless of subjective American intenwhere it is deemed permissible to displace Soviet tions, the option is fatally flawed because an immanent views, capabilities, and intentions onto the West. This logic of war dictates its "inevitable" escalation. is the case with military strategy and military technology; there are no such things as a socialist military
The Soviet penchant for secrecy is an important option or a capitalist tank. 3 Only the ends of power factor in their use of surrogates. Even though they are ideologically charged; the means are normally continue to mirror image when there is no requirement value free.
for secrecy, i.e., when Moscow is explicit about its own options, that is no reason for discarding secrecy
In this paper we make no effort at a general as a factor. If you are going to use surrogates, you theory of Soviet mirror imaging in all spheres; nor, have to be consistent; otherwise Soviet readers would though it is equally desirable, do we attempt to explain be confused.
Consistency is also encouraged by a particular false, they normally turn out to be symmetrical Soviet propaganda convention that is rooted in ideolcounterparts of options desired by Soviet authors or ogy. According to Marxism-Leninism, imperialism is possessed by the USSR. If that is true, then it should the only source of war and the arms race; the USSR be unnecessary to demonstrate in any particular case never originates a threat. But there is a corollary: that the attribution hits or misses the mark, and the Moscow must respond to any threat. There is even an very fact of attribution will constitute evidence of oft-cited passage from Lenin that it would be "foolish Soviet views and intentions. We will also have made and even criminal" not to acquire all the means of a giant step forward when there is general acknowlwarfare possessed by the imperialists. Therefore, if edgement that selectiveness in surrogate analysis is as the imperialists actually have an option not available methodologically unsound as selectiveness in the to the USSR, the Russians must ignore its existence, analysis of other types of data. dismiss claims of it as dezinformatisiya, or declare its utter non-viability (i.e., declare the option will "inSurrogate analysis is all the more important in evitably" escalate); to fail to deny the existence or the view of the declining Soviet frankness. They mirror efficacy of a unilateral U.S. option would be an inimaged just as much in the 1960s as today. However, tolerable confession of weakness. But by the same they were then relatively open about their intentions token, if the Kremlin has developed an option for for all-out war. They are more reticent today in speakwhich there is no NATO counterpart, it must nevertheing of their limited options, compelling us to take less attribute the option to NATO, because Marxistgreater notice of views displaced onto the West. Leninists never initiate, they only react.
A kindred rule: Pay close attention to historical
Perhaps the classic example of this pattern comes treatments; lessons of the past are often surrogate from the early nuclear years. Garthoff reports that, for lessons for the present. There can be no question of the entire period 1947-1953, when the U.S. had a this practice, however difficult it may be to establish monopoly of nuclear weapons, there was not a single in any particular case. In his masterful study of the article on the subject in the periodical military press. Sino-Soviet conflict, Zagoria found that rumors of However, when Moscow acquired its own nuclear frontier incidents between the two countries in 1960 arms, this same press suddenly "discovered" that the gained credibility "when a Soviet historical journal U.S. had them too-the American possession justifysuddenly and gratuitously criticized unprovoked ing the Russian.
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Chinese assaults on undefended Russian borderlands in the 17th century...."57 Mirror imaging, or course, is not unknown in the West. In the Soviet Union, however, the practice is At least for the purpose of communication, Soviet neither unconscious nor tailored to the requirements of military scientists also do not believe in history for its budgetary infighting; indeed, the mirror imaging own sake; they are incorrigibly present minded. On one usually appears after the military-policy and doctrinal occasion, normally without letting the reader know, decisions have already been made. Nor is the practice historical events will be intended as direct analogues of designed at bottom to justify the Soviet posture to a the current situation. On another occasion, a "lawforeign audience or to exploit divisions within NATO; governed pattern" of development will be found in the obligation to project intentions onto the West has, history which, when extrapolated by the reader, will in fact, often meant forgoing a better line for exploitenlighten him about the present. The analyst must ing NATO's internal divisions. On other occasions, continually be asking himself: what relevance does this the projection has been so subtle that it entirely eshistorical discussion have for today? Perhaps it has caped the attention of Western specialists, none that the analyst can discover, but he should always look for a match, without straining. Analysts who reject surrogate interpretations out of methodological scruple are renouncing an important
Pay close attention to Soviet definitions. This source of intelligence. In my view, it will constitute a counsel applies to terms often defined (for example, real methodological advance when analysts become military doctrine and military science); terms rarely convinced that, regardless of whether the views or defined (for example, designations of the combat options attributed to foreign opponents are true or objective); terms incompletely defined (a general problem); terms obliquely defined (e.g., "short war");
The Russians will tell you no outright lies, but terms defined only by usage ("military superiority," a expect to be misled, up one side and down the other. war's "immediate" and "intermediate" strategic objecAfter you have read a key passage once, twice, thrice, tives); terms nowhere near adequately defined even by read it again to make sure it says what you think it usage (for example, the difference between "branches" says. (I can assure you it will not in an extraordinarily and "components" of the armed forces); and terms high percentage of cases.) borrowed from the West but given their own Russian definitions (various types of war). Normally the
The real Soviet point is often simply a logical analyst will not realize he has a problem with definiimplication of the stated point. For example, if an tions; that is the danger. He has to be continually author says that a particular kind of war "might" asking himself: do I really understand what this escalate, this automatically means that it might not means? When a definition does float by, grab it; you escalate as well-and that is the real point. The may never see it again, possibility of escalation, though true in the USSR's reckoning, is not the real point.
Pay close attention to hierarchies of terminology.
There is a great deal of difference between a "main," a Often, to get the message, the analyst must corn-"most important," and an "important" mission or pare present and past statements and formulae on the branch of the armed forces (a "basic" mission or same subject, noting the similarities and differences. branch is a thornier problem Moscow was frank in stating, for example, that it had it is crucial to know whether the influence is accountintroduced new types and forms of strategic action, ed "decisive" or "vital," or simply "significant,"
and for the following reasons. They would say: we "great," "serious," or "enormous" (the last four all used to believe this, and now we believe that, and here interchangeable terms).
is the explanation. No more; the reader is not cued to changes. The current formula alone is given. Thus, When key subject matter is encountered, careful the analyst has to carry around the past in his memory attention must be paid to every word in the passage.
for collation with the present, without being prompted. The really crucial words will, of course, differ according to the subject matter. In the case of "the character Do not expect the Russians to flag a noteworthy and specific features of war," the odds given for the item. The naked formula alone is introduced, in the stability of the option are of greatest interest, i.e., most casual manner, without preparation. There is whether it "might" expand and escalate or whether it usually nothing in even the most crucial passages that will "inevitably" do so. In the case of the "methods of clamors for our attention. warfare" and the "principles of the military art," attention should focus on the condensed, short-hand Single examples do not prove a point. In their formulae favored by Soviet strategists. In the case of communications, the Soviets have made a deliberate the "types and forms of strategic action," the interest choice in favor of obscurity. Because of their tenuous,
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should be in the specialized terminology used to elliptical quality, and their tendency to be overdesignate them, and the ranking of the types and inclusive or under-inclusive, too much credence forms. In the case of the factors influencing the should not be put in interpretations based on single course and outcome of war, special note should be examples. Here, as almost always, patience is a taken of the degree of impact on both the course and virtue. Other examples can be found that will ilthe outcome, considered separately.
luminate the shady areas, since in any system of esoteric communication there has to be signal redundancy.
interpretations, find a common denominator, and Hansel and Gretel did not simply drop a pebble here begin to work his way toward the whole option. and there; they dropped pebbles (lots of pebbles) all along the way.
Do not be too "picky" about sources. There are analysts who swear only by the General Staff journal, Single points, however well established, do not Military Thought. They reason that, because of its necessarily make an option. The analyst should not be restricted circulation, it alone will give us the "straight satisfied with a point, even several points, understood dope," and in a straightforward manner. A priori, this within the confines of a single subject-matter category. is unimpeachable; it does not work out that way in To be confident of the character of an option, he must fact. Military Thought is a much better than average find compatible points in several categories, source; however, it is no more authoritative than other publications, does not for the most part present unique Do not expect the Russians to make sustained information, and employs the same esoteric cornarguments. It is unusual for them to treat several munication techniques as the open literature. I have aspects of an option as a connected whole. They spin never seen a fundamental point established in the out little rags of information, which the reader himself journal that was not made elsewhere, usually earlier, has to shuffle around to find the fit and then stitch and with greater clarity. together into a garment, in the process treating a mixed bag of rags by different authors as if they were
On the other hand, there is widespread scorn for the product of a single weaver. journals put out by "think tanks," such as the Institute for the U.S.A. and Canada. It is said that they are full When the Russians do take a stab at sustained of propaganda and the analysts "don't know anyarguments, expect obscurity. The analyst will not thing." But all Soviet sources propagandize; butter only find expressions that are as elliptical as intimate will never melt in the mouth of Soviet righteousness. family discourse, but also elliptical and transposed This does not affect substance. As for the charge that logic. This is not the result of any difference in Eastern think-tank personnel know nothing important, we had or Western thought processes (Hegelian vs. Arisbetter not believe it. Their stock in trade is American totelian), but of sheer communication cussedness. The national-security policy; it is obligatory that these be analyst will often have to interpolate, but he should be surrogate discussions; and think-tank authors have to careful to take his logical cues from the text; "anything know Soviet policy and doctrine to make the mirror goes" is not the right methodological approach.
image fit Because surrogate discussions can be more open with details, the USA journal is probably our best Read as widely as possible in the relevant literasingle source today. ture. Soviet military thought is highly integrated, but compartmented in the presentation. Military policy is Though no sources or institutions dealing with linked to military doctrine. There is no such thing as a the right subject matter should be rejected on pringround-force or naval doctrine or even a doctrine for ciple, they do vary in value, and their relative value the armed forces; there is only a single military dochas changed over time, for both unaccountable and trine for the entire state. However, only aspects of an accountable reasons. In the 1960s, the military-policy option are likely to be discussed in the specialized journal, Communist of the Armed Forces, was highly journals. The air-force analyst, therefore, should not informative, not only on War and the Army, which confine himself to Aviation and Cosmonautics, the one would expect, but also on military doctrine and navy analyst to the Naval Digest, or the articles on military science; today, inexplicably, it is virtually these strvices in Red Star and in books.
useless on all counts. In the 1960s, the output of faculty members of the General Staff Academy was The analyst has to cast his net as widely as possithe most directly informative on Soviet doctrine and ble because of the opaqueness of Soviet discourse and strategy; today that honor, unaccountably, seems to the relative lack of sustained argument. Only by belong to the Institute of Military History. noting the absence of old themes, and the repeated iteration of new themes across a vast body of books Some of the shift in information value is exand articles, can an analyst be confident of individual plainable by the recourse to surrogates. 
